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Central Bank Strategic Forecasting

Author

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  • SEBASTIAN GOMEZ-BARRERO
  • JULIAN A. PARRA-POLANIA

Abstract

type="main" xml:lang="en"> In most of the literature on transparency it has been standard to assume that central banks release truthful information when communicating with the public. However, the monetary policymaker may act strategically and misrepresent private information intending to reduce economic volatility by manipulating inflation expectations. We set up a simple model which includes misrepresentation as a possible action for the central bank and derive some testable implications. The empirical evidence from the analysis of inflation forecasts of six central banks (Brazil, Canada, England, Iceland, New Zealand, and Sweden) is consistent with the existence of strategic forecasting. (JEL E52, E58)

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Gomez-Barrero & Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2014. "Central Bank Strategic Forecasting," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(4), pages 802-810, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:32:y:2014:i:4:p:802-810
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ahrens, Steffen & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Tettamanzi, Michele, 2023. "The Stabilizing Effects of Publishing Strategic Central Bank Projections," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 826-868, April.
    2. Granziera, Eleonora & Jalasjoki, Pirkka & Paloviita, Maritta, 2021. "The bias and efficiency of the ECB inflation projections: a State dependent analysis," Research Discussion Papers 7/2021, Bank of Finland.
    3. Ahrens, Steffen & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Tettamanzi, Michele, 2017. "The Stabilizing Role of Forward Guidance: A Macro Experiment," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168063, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Eleonora Granziera & Pirkka Jalasjoki & Maritta Paloviita, 2021. "The Bias and Efficiency of the ECB Inflation Projections: a State Dependent Analysis," Working Paper 2021/1, Norges Bank.
    5. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2016-053 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Granziera, Eleonora & Jalasjoki, Pirkka & Paloviita, Maritta, 2021. "The bias and efficiency of the ECB inflation projections: A state dependent analysis," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 7/2021, Bank of Finland.
    7. Granziera, Eleonora & Jalasjoki, Pirkka & Paloviita, Maritta, 2024. "The bias of the ECB inflation projections: A State-dependent analysis," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 4/2024, Bank of Finland.
    8. Duffy, John & Heinemann, Frank, 2021. "Central bank reputation, cheap talk and transparency as substitutes for commitment: Experimental evidence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 887-903.
    9. Eleonora Granziera & Pirkka Jalasjoki & Maritta Paloviita, 2025. "The Bias of the ECB Inflation Projections: A State‐Dependent Analysis," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 922-940, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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