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Is Transparency About Central Bank Plans Desirable?

Author

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  • Anne Sibert

Abstract

A central bank with private information about its preferences has an incentive to reduce its planned inflation to increase the public's perception of its inflation aversion and lower expected future inflation. A regime is said to be transparent if planned inflation is observable and reveals the central bank's preferences and to be non-transparent if planned inflation is unobservable and can be only imperfectly inferred from actual inflation. A central bank in the non-transparent regime is said to become more transparent when actual inflation becomes a better signal of planned inflation. I find several results about transparent and non-transparent regimes: some are novel and some contrast with the results of earlier papers. In particular, I demonstrate that in a non-transparent regime, increased transparency need not improve the public's ability to infer a central bank's private information. I show that society and central banks are better off with more transparency. My numerical results suggest that society and central banks prefer the transparent to the non-transparent regimes. (JEL: E42, E52, E58) (c) 2009 by the European Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Sibert, 2009. "Is Transparency About Central Bank Plans Desirable?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(4), pages 831-857, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:7:y:2009:i:4:p:831-857
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2014. "Inflation forecast contracts," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 26-40.
    2. Rhee, Hyuk Jae & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2013. "Central bank transparency: Does it matter?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 183-197.
    3. Hyuk Rhee & Nurlan Turdaliev, 2015. "Central bank policy instrument forecasts," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 10(2), pages 221-245, October.
    4. Sebastian Gomez-Barrero & Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2014. "Central Bank Strategic Forecasting," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(4), pages 802-810, October.
    5. Esteban Colla de Robertis, 2010. "Monetary Policy Committees and the Decision to Publish Voting Records," Money Affairs, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(2), pages 97-139, July-Dece.
    6. Volker Hahn, 2009. "Why the Publication of Socially Harmful Information May Be Socially Desirable," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/122, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    7. Hahn, Volker, 2014. "Transparency In Monetary Policy, Signaling, And Heterogeneous Information," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(02), pages 369-394, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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