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Monetary Policy Committees and the Decision to Publish Voting Records

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  • Esteban Colla de Robertis

    (Escuela de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales)

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  • Esteban Colla de Robertis, 2010. "Monetary Policy Committees and the Decision to Publish Voting Records," Money Affairs, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 97-139, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:cml:moneya:v:xxiii:y:2010:i:2:p:97-139
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