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Monetary Policy Committees and the Decision to Publish Voting Records

  • Esteban Colla de Robertis

    (Escuela de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales)

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://www.cemla.org/PDF/moneyaffairs/pub_monaff_xxiii_02.pdf
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Article provided by Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos in its journal Money Affairs.

Volume (Year): XXIII (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (July-December)
Pages: 97-139

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Handle: RePEc:cml:moneya:v:xxiii:y:2010:i:2:p:97-139
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  1. Besley, Timothy & Meads, Neil & Surico, Paolo, 2007. "Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary Policy-Making," Discussion Papers 20, Monetary Policy Committee Unit, Bank of England.
  2. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Mike Felgenhauer & Hans Peter Grüner, 2008. "Committees and Special Interests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 219-243, 04.
  5. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2009. "Purdah-On the Rationale for Central Bank Silence around Policy Meetings," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2-3), pages 517-528, 03.
  6. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 2008. "The FOMC versus the Staff: Where Can Monetary Policymakers Add Value?," NBER Working Papers 13751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 10, December.
  8. Olivier J. Blanchard & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Paolo Mauro, 2010. "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy," IMF Staff Position Notes 2010/03, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  10. Anke Weber, 2010. "Monetary Policy Committees, Learning and Communication," IMF Working Papers 10/85, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Martin G. Kocher & Mikulas Luptacik & Matthias Sutter, 2001. "Measuring Productivity of Research in Economics. A Cross-Country Study Using DEA," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp077, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
  12. Kocher, Martin G. & Sutter, Matthias, 2001. "The Institutional Concentration of Authors in Top Journals of Economics during the Last Two Decades," Munich Reprints in Economics 18183, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  13. Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. & de Haan, Jakob & Koedijk, Kees, 2002. "Small is beautiful: measuring the research input and output of European central banks," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 365-374, June.
  14. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
  15. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-77, August.
  16. Marcelo Ochoa & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006. "El Banco Central de Chile en Comparación con los Bancos Centrales del Mundo," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 367, Central Bank of Chile.
  17. Alan S. Blinder & John Morgan, 2007. "Leadership in Groups: A Monetary Policy Experiment," NBER Working Papers 13391, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
  19. Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-55, November.
  20. Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 23-46, February.
  21. Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker, 2005. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 5155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608.
  23. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
  24. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665.
  25. BAUWENS, Luc & KIRMAN, Alan & LUBRANO, Michel & PROTOPOPESCU, Camelia, . "Ranking economics departments in Europe: a statistical approach," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1694, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  26. Fujiki, Hiroshi, 2005. "The Monetary Policy Committee and the Incentive Problem: A Selective Survey," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 23(S1), pages 37-82, October.
  27. Anne Sibert, 2009. "Is Transparency About Central Bank Plans Desirable?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(4), pages 831-857, 06.
  28. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
  29. Petra Gerlach-Kristen, 2004. "Is the MPC's Voting Record Informative about Future UK Monetary Policy?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(2), pages 299-313, 06.
  30. Otmar Issing, 1999. "The Eurosystem: Transparent andAccountable or 'Willem in Euroland'," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, 09.
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