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A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability

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  • Jorge Ponce

    (Banco Central de Paraguay)

Abstract

This paper uses a formal model of a bank supervisor to derive policy implications on the optimal institutional arrangements for effective banking supervision. I find that bank supervisors should have political independence, and that independence should be complemented by legal protection and accountability arrangements for bank supervisors. I provide empirical evidence supporting these results.Length: 39 pages
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Ponce, 2010. "A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 141-181, July-Dece.
    • Handle: RePEc:cml:moneya:v:xxiii:y:2010:i:2:p:141-181
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    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    2. Pratt, Richard & Berg, Alexander, 2014. "Governance of securities regulators : a framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6800, The World Bank.
    3. Athanassiou, Phoebus, 2011. "Financial sector supervisors' accountability: a european perspective," Legal Working Paper Series 12, European Central Bank.
    4. Masciandaro, Donato & Pansini, Rosaria Vega & Quintyn, Marc, 2013. "The economic crisis: Did supervision architecture and governance matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 578-596.
    5. Boyer, Pierre C. & Ponce, Jorge, 2012. "Regulatory capture and banking supervision reform," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 206-217.
    6. Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Ms. Rosaria Vega Pansini & Donato Masciandaro, 2011. "The Economic Crisis: Did Financial Supervision Matter?," IMF Working Papers 2011/261, International Monetary Fund.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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