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A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability

Author

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  • Jorge Ponce

    () (Banco Central del Uruguay)

Abstract

This paper uses a formal model of a bank supervisor to derive policy implications on the optimal institutional arrangements for effective banking supervision. I find that bank supervisors should have political independence, and that independence should be complemented by legal protection and accountability arrangements for bank supervisors. I provide empirical evidence supporting these results.Length: 39 pages

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Ponce, 2008. "A Normative Analysis of Banking Supervision: Independence, Legal Protection and Accountability," Documentos de trabajo 2008006, Banco Central del Uruguay, revised 21 Oct 2010.
  • Handle: RePEc:bku:doctra:2008006
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Estadisticas-e-Indicadores/Documentos%20de%20Trabajo/6.2008.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pratt, Richard & Berg, Alexander, 2014. "Governance of securities regulators : a framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6800, The World Bank.
    2. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    3. Marc G Quintyn & Rosaria Vega Pansini & Donato Masciandaro, 2011. "The Economic Crisis; Did Financial Supervision Matter?," IMF Working Papers 11/261, International Monetary Fund.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking supervision; institutional organization; independence; legal protection; accountability; empirical evidence;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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