Staff, Functions, and Staff Costs at Central Banks: An International Comparison with a Labor-demand Model
During the period 2000-2004 central banks sustained a generalized reduction in their staff, which was accompanied, in most cases, with significant increases in staff costs. This could obey to an enhanced interest of central banks in focusing on their core functions. In fact, central banks have changed the ways they perform their operative functions (e.g. currency operations, payment systems operation, printing notes, etc.) through different strategies aimed at gathering the participation of third parties. These strategies differ according to the relationship that central banks have with the financial sector and the government, as well as to their historical tradition and modernization trend. To explain the effect of these changes on the staff, we estimated a short-term labor demand function for 66 central banks using a panel data model with random effects. Results indicate that central banks’ labor demand is strongly determined by the country’s population, economic development level and changes in operative functions, as well as by staff costs. In addition, we found a low employment-wage elasticity suggesting the presence of a flexible budgetary constrain in central banks.
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (57-1) 3431111
Fax: (57-1) 2841686
Web page: http://www.banrep.org/publicaciones/pub_borra.htm
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999.
"Should banking supervision and monetary policy tasks be given to different agencies?,"
Economics Working Papers
411, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Di Noia, Carmine & Di Giorgio, Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies?," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 361-78, November.
- Carmine Di Noia & Giorgio Di Giorgio, 1999. "Should Banking Supervision and Monetary Policy Tasks Be Given to Different Agencies," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-11, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999.
"Is bank supervision central to central banking?,"
99-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Saikkonen, Pentti, 1991. "Asymptotically Efficient Estimation of Cointegration Regressions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(01), pages 1-21, March.
- Eduardo Borensztein & Carmen Reinhart, 1994.
"The Macroeconomic Determinants of Commodity Prices,"
IMF Working Papers
94/9, International Monetary Fund.
- Eduardo Borensztein & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1994. "The Macroeconomic Determinants of Commodity Prices," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 41(2), pages 236-261, June.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Borensztein, Eduardo, 1994. "The Macroeconomic Determinants of Commodity Prices," MPRA Paper 6979, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Borensztein, Eduardo, 1994. "The determinants of commodity prices," MPRA Paper 13870, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- René Lalonde & Zhenhua Zhu & Frédérick Demers, 2003.
"Forecasting and Analyzing World Commodity Prices,"
Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(1), pages 1-30, January-J.
- Nout Wellink & Bryan Chapple & Philipp Maier, 2002.
"The role of national central banks within the European System of Central Banks: The example of De Nederlandsche Bank,"
- Nout Wellink & Bryan Chapple & Philipp Maier, 2002. "The role of national central banks within the European System of Central Banks: The example of De Nederlandsche Bank," MEB Series (discontinued) 2002-13, Netherlands Central Bank, Monetary and Economic Policy Department.
- James Bohn & Diana Hancock & Paul Bauer, 2001. "Estimates of scale and cost efficiency for Federal Reserve currency operations," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q IV, pages 2-26.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:419. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Clorith Angélica Bahos Olivera)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.