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Studying the role of political competition in the evolution of government size over long horizons

  • Ferris, J. Stephen
  • Park, Soo-Bin
  • Winer, Stanley L.

    ()

We argue for the use of cointegration and error correction analysis as a method to combine economic factors that are nonstationary with political factors that are stationary into a dynamic, empirical model of the evolution of public policy over long periods. The approach we develop is applied to disentangle the contributions of economics and politics to the evolution of public expenditure by the Government of Canada over 130 years, from the origin of the modern state to the end of the 20th century. Political competition emerges robustly as the primary political factor affecting government size in the long run as well as over shorter horizons.

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File URL: http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/RePEc/uca/ucapdv/winer123.pdf
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Paper provided by Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS in its series POLIS Working Papers with number 111.

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Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:111
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://polis.unipmn.it

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