Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets
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- Barro, Robert J., 1986.
"Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
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- Robert J. Barro, 1986. "Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 1794, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Herrendorf, Berthold, 1997. "Importing Credibility through Exchange Rate Pegging," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(442), pages 687-94, May.
- Laubach, T. & Posen, A.S., 1997. "Disciplined Discretion: Monetary Targeting in Germany and Switzerland," Princeton Essays in International Economics 206, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
- Alex Cukierman, 2000.
"Establishing a reputation for dependability by means of inflation targets,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 53-76, 03.
- Cukierman, A., 1999. "Establishing a Reputation for Dependability by Means of Inflation Targets," Discussion Paper 1999-99, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983.
"Monetary policy games and the role of private information,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-70, December.
- Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
- Douglas O. Staiger & James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, 1997.
"How Precise Are Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment?,"
in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 195-246
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, 1996. "How Precise are Estimates of the Natural Rate of Unemployment?," NBER Working Papers 5477, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-55, November.
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