IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/annfin/v12y2016i2d10.1007_s10436-016-0276-6.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monetary policy games, financial instability and incomplete information

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Richard Barrett

    (University of Birmingham)

  • Ioanna Kokores

    (University of Piraeus)

  • Somnath Sen

    (University of Birmingham)

Abstract

In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, monetary authorities, while pursuing traditional objectives, such as the control of inflation, are also eager to promote financial stability. In this paper, we model the strategic interaction of the central bank and the financial sector and explore a simple monetary policy game with perceived substantial risks to financial stability, where the central bank can be of two types, one pursuing strict inflation-targeting and the other concerned with affecting the expectations formed by the financial sector participants; however, the financial sector is unsure which, due to incomplete information. The conclusion is that for small shocks to inflation there is a pooling equilibrium, whereas for larger shocks there is separation. In the latter case, the central bank that has an explicit financial stability concern is willing to exercise more muted control to inflation in order to reinforce the safety of the financial sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Richard Barrett & Ioanna Kokores & Somnath Sen, 2016. "Monetary policy games, financial instability and incomplete information," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 161-178, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:annfin:v:12:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10436-016-0276-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10436-016-0276-6
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10436-016-0276-6
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10436-016-0276-6?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Centralized Wage Setting and Monetary Policy in a Reputational Equilibrium," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 102-118, February.
    2. Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn A. King, 1997. "Independence and Accountability," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Iwao Kuroda (ed.), Towards More Effective Monetary Policy, chapter 10, pages 299-340, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Barro, Robert J., 1986. "Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 3-20, January.
    5. Charles Nolan & Eric Schaling, 1996. "Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Central Bank Accountability," Bank of England working papers 54, Bank of England.
    6. Charles Goodhart & Pojanart Sunirand & Dimitrios Tsomocos, 2006. "A model to analyse financial fragility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(1), pages 107-142, January.
    7. Charles A.E. Goodhart & Pojanart Sunirand & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos, 2005. "A risk assessment model for banks," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 197-224, September.
    8. Dominique Guegan & Wayne Tarrant, 2012. "On the Necessity of Five Risk Measures," Post-Print halshs-00721339, HAL.
    9. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 607-654, June.
    10. Charles A. E. Goodhart, 1995. "Price Stability and Financial Fragility," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Kuniho Sawamoto & Zenta Nakajima & Hiroo Taguchi (ed.), Financial Stability in a Changing Environment, chapter 10, pages 439-509, Palgrave Macmillan.
    11. Dominique Guégan & Wayne Tarrant, 2012. "On the necessity of five risk measures," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 533-552, November.
    12. Q. Akram & Gunnar Bårdsen & Kjersti-Gro Lindquist, 2007. "Pursuing financial stability under an inflation-targeting regime," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 131-153, January.
    13. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    14. Allan Drazen & Paul R. Masson, 1994. "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(3), pages 735-754.
    15. Ioanna Kokores, 2015. "Lean-Against-the-Wind Monetary Policy: The Post-Crisis Shift in the Literature," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 65(3-4), pages 66-99, july-Dece.
    16. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00721339 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Plosser, Charles I., 2014. "Monetary rules: Theory and practice," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 144-146.
    18. Shigenori Shiratsuka, 2001. "Asset prices, financial stability and monetary policy: based on Japan’s experience of the asset price bubble," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Marrying the macro- and micro-prudential dimensions of financial stability, volume 1, pages 261-284, Bank for International Settlements.
    19. Svensson, Lars E O, 1999. " Inflation Targeting: Some Extensions," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(3), pages 337-361, September.
    20. Cukierman, Alex & Liviatan, Nissan, 1991. "Optimal accommodation by strong policymakers under incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 99-127, February.
    21. Ball, Laurence, 1995. "Time-consistent policy and persistent changes in inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 329-350, November.
    22. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-538, June.
    23. C. A. E. Goodhart, 1995. "Price Stability and Financial Fragility (1995)," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Central Bank and the Financial System, chapter 14, pages 263-302, Palgrave Macmillan.
    24. Claudio Borio, 2014. "Monetary policy and financial stability: what role in prevention and recovery?," BIS Working Papers 440, Bank for International Settlements.
    25. Borio, Claudio, 2014. "The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 182-198.
    26. Masaaki Shirakawa, 2010. "Revisiting the Philosophy behind Central Bank Policy," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 485-493, December.
    27. Christopher Kent & Philip Lowe, 1997. "Asset-price Bubbles and Monetary Policy," RBA Research Discussion Papers rdp9709, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    28. Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-455, November.
    29. Lucas Papademos, 2006. "Policy-making in EMU: strategies, rules and discretion," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(1), pages 25-38, January.
    30. Dominique Guegan & Wayne Tarrant, 2012. "On the Necessity of Five Risk Measures," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00721339, HAL.
    31. Philip Lowe & Claudio Borio, 2002. "Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus," BIS Working Papers 114, Bank for International Settlements.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ioanna Kokores, 2015. "Lean-Against-the-Wind Monetary Policy: The Post-Crisis Shift in the Literature," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 65(3-4), pages 66-99, july-Dece.
    2. Chortareas, Georgios E & Miller, Stephen M, 2003. "Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 271-295, September.
    3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    4. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2003. "Credibility costs in the monetary integration game," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 11(4), pages 727-741, December.
    5. Mihov, Ilian & Sibert, Anne, 2006. "Credibility and Flexibility with Independent Monetary Policy Committees," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 23-46, February.
    6. Ball, Laurence, 1995. "Time-consistent policy and persistent changes in inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 329-350, November.
    7. Sibert, Anne & Mihov, Ilian, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," CEPR Discussion Papers 3278, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Elmar Mertens, 2016. "Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 661-698, June.
    9. Claudio Borio, 2011. "Rediscovering the Macroeconomic Roots of Financial Stability Policy: Journey, Challenges, and a Way Forward," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 87-117, December.
    10. Maria Kasselaki & Athanasios Tagkalakis, 2014. "Financial soundness indicators and financial crisis episodes," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 623-669, November.
    11. Florin Bilbiie & D. Stasavage, 2005. "Incomplete Fiscal Rules with Imperfect Enforcement," Working Papers hal-00515668, HAL.
    12. Canavan, Chris & Tommasi, Mariano, 1997. "On the credibility of alternative exchange rate regimes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 101-122, October.
    13. Andrea Beccarini, 2017. "Verifying time inconsistency of the ECB monetary policy by means of a regime-switching approach," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 203-227, May.
    14. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Julio Cesar Albuquerque Bastos, 2014. "Effects of reputation and credibility on monetary policy: theory and evidence for Brazil," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 41(3), pages 387-404, May.
    15. Yuxiang, Karl & Chen, Zhongchang, 2010. "Monetary policy credibility and inflationary expectation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 487-497, August.
    16. Marcelo De Carvalho Griebeler, 2016. "On The Existence Of Loss Function For Some Useful Classes Of Central Bankers," Anais do XLII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 42nd Brazilian Economics Meeting] 121, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    17. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
    18. Sibert, Anne, 2002. "Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1093-1109, June.
    19. Boschen, John F. & Weise, Charles L., 2004. "Does the dynamic time consistency model of inflation explain cross-country differences in inflations dynamics?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 735-759, September.
    20. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy; Central bank; Financial stability; Strategic behavior; Incomplete information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:annfin:v:12:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10436-016-0276-6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.