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Centralized Wage Setting and Monetary Policy in a Reputational Equilibrium

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  • Tabellini, Guido

Abstract

This paper analyzes a repeated game between the central bank and a centralized trade union. The central bank would be better off if it could commit to a noninflationary strategy. When this commitment is not enforceable, a noninflationary equilibrium can still be sustained by a reputational mechanism if the central bank has superior information about its own objective function. The qualitative properties of this reputational equilibrium are shown to differ from the cases considered in the existing literature where the central bank was modeled as playing a game against competitive labor markets. Copyright 1988 by Ohio State University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Centralized Wage Setting and Monetary Policy in a Reputational Equilibrium," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(1), pages 102-118, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:20:y:1988:i:1:p:102-18
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    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    2. Mayes, David G. & Vilmunen, Jouko, 1999. "Unemployment in a small open economy: Finland and New Zealand," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 10/1999, Bank of Finland.
    3. Manfred Neumann, 1991. "Precommitment by central bank independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 95-112, June.
    4. Giordano, Raffaela, 2001. "Wage bargaining and inflation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 359-387, December.
    5. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
    6. Agiomirgianakis, George M., 1998. "Monetary Policy Games and International Migration of Labor in Interdependent Economies," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 243-266, April.
    7. Prof. Neil D. Karunaratne, 2000. "Inflation Targeting Macroeconomic Distortions and the Policy Reaction Function," Discussion Papers Series 269, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    8. Juha Kilponen & David Mayes & Jouko Vilmunen, 1999. "Labour Market Flexibility in Northern Europe," One Europe or Several? Working Papers 2, One-Europe Programme.
    9. Lawler, Phillip, 2007. "Strategic wage setting, inflation uncertainty and optimal delegation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1105-1118, December.
    10. Funke, Norbert, 1992. "Wage formation and monetary policy rules," Kiel Working Papers 514, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
    11. Sorge, Marco M., 2013. "Robust delegation with uncertain monetary policy preferences," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 73-78.
    12. Goodhart, C. A. E. & Huang, Haizhou, 1995. "What is the Central Bank's game?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 119176, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Charles Richard Barrett & Ioanna Kokores & Somnath Sen, 2016. "Monetary policy games, financial instability and incomplete information," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 161-178, May.
    14. Lawler, Phillip, 2002. "Monetary uncertainty, strategic wage setting and equilibrium employment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 35-40, September.
    15. Maxime Menuet, 2020. "Is a Long War Desirable? Optimal Debt Concessions in Attrition Warfare," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 139, pages 105-130.
    16. Donato Masciandaro, 2021. "Central Bank Governance in Monetary Policy Economics (1981-2020)," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21153, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    17. Alberto Bagnai, 2014. "Un external compact per rilanciare l'Europa," a/ Working Papers Series 1401, Italian Association for the Study of Economic Asymmetries, Rome (Italy).
    18. Mayes, David G. & Vilmunen, Jouko, 1999. "Unemployment in a small open economy : Finland and New Zealand," Research Discussion Papers 10/1999, Bank of Finland.
    19. repec:ezo:ezppap:wp24 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Oliver Pamp, 2008. "Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment in the European Union," European Political Economy Review, European Political Economy Infrastructure Consortium, vol. 8(Spring), pages 4-39.

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