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Macroeconomic policy games with incomplete information : A survey

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  • Driffill, John

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  • Driffill, John, 1988. "Macroeconomic policy games with incomplete information : A survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 533-541, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:32:y:1988:i:2-3:p:533-541
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    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    2. Barro, Robert J., 1986. "Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 3-20, January.
    3. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    4. Baxter, Marianne, 1985. "The role of expectations in stabilization policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 343-362, May.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Driffill, John, 1988. "Macroeconomic policy games with incomplete information : A survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 533-541, March.
    7. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    8. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    9. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    10. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    11. Blanchard, Olivier J, 1984. "The Lucas Critique and the Volcker Deflation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 211-215, May.
    12. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-538, June.
    13. Driffill, John, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy Games with Incomplete Information: Some Extensions," CEPR Discussion Papers 159, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Vickers, John, 1986. "Signalling in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 443-455, November.
    15. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Salsano, 2022. "Monetary policy when the objectives of central bankers are imperfectly observable," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(4), pages 396-415, September.
    2. Agiomirgianakis, George M., 1998. "Monetary Policy Games and International Migration of Labor in Interdependent Economies," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 243-266, April.
    3. Driffill, John, 1988. "Macroeconomic policy games with incomplete information : A survey," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 533-541, March.
    4. Dornbusch, Rudiger & Fischer, Stanley, 1993. "Moderate Inflation," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 7(1), pages 1-44, January.
    5. Juan Ayuso Huertas, 1991. "Los efectos del anuncio de un objetivo de inflación," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 15(3), pages 627-644, September.
    6. Peter Welzel, 1992. "A note on the time inconsistency of strategic trade policy," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 203-214, June.
    7. Goodhart, Charles, 1989. "The Conduct of Monetary Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(396), pages 293-346, June.
    8. Hein, Eckhard, 2001. "Institutions and Macroeconomic Performance: Central Bank Independence, Labour Market Institutions and the Perspectives for Inflation and Employment in the European Monetary Union," MPRA Paper 18880, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Weber, A.A., 1988. "The credibility of monetary policies, policymakers' reputation and the EMS-hypothesis : Empirical evidence from 13 countries," Discussion Paper 1988-3, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    10. Francesco Salsano, 2005. "Monetary Policy in the Presence Of Imperfect Observability Of The Objectives Of Central Bankers," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0523, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    11. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 1997. "Structural uncertainty and subsidy removal for economies in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(9), pages 1709-1733, December.
    12. Weber, A.A., 1988. "The credibility of monetary policies, policymakers' reputation and the EMS-hypothesis : Empirical evidence from 13 countries," Other publications TiSEM 7d95e7bb-efff-41a6-8ea2-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    13. Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 1994. "Political Constraints on the Developmental State: Alternative Theoretical Explanations," CUDARE Working Papers 201466, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.

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