Disciplined Discretion: Monetary Targeting in Germany and Switzerland
This essay offers an analysis of actual German and Swiss monetary policy that explains this gap between operation and performance. It shows that neither country's central bank can be called a monetary targeter, according to a strict, formal definition of targeting, and it argues that the historical record shows a different use for announced monetary targets in these countries.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: International Finance Section, Department of Economics Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A|
Phone: (609) 258-4000
Fax: (609) 258-6419
Web page: http://www.econ.princeton.edu/
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