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Monetary Policy and Lexicographic Preference Ordering

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  • Driffill, John
  • Rotondi, Zeno

Abstract

In this Paper we argue that the objectives given to the European Central Bank in the Maastricht Treaty are not well represented by the widely used weighted sum of squared deviations of inflation and output from target (plus possibly terms in squared changes in interest rates to pick up interest rate smoothing). Instead the stated lexicographic ordering should be taken at face value and its implications explored fully. We set out a number of models that do this, and comment on their implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Driffill, John & Rotondi, Zeno, 2004. "Monetary Policy and Lexicographic Preference Ordering," CEPR Discussion Papers 4247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4247
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Beetsma, Roel M W J & Jensen, Henrik, 1998. "Inflation Targets and Contracts with Uncertain Central Banker Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 384-403, August.
    3. Orphanides, Athanasios & Wieland, Volker, 2000. "Inflation zone targeting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1351-1387, June.
    4. Svensson, Lars E O, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, "Conservative" Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 98-114, March.
    5. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, January.
    6. Svensson, Lars E O, 1999. "Price Stability as a Target for Monetary Policy: Defining and Maintaining Price Stability," CEPR Discussion Papers 2196, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Smets, Frank, 2000. "What horizon for price stability," Working Paper Series 0024, European Central Bank.
    8. Laubach, T. & Posen, A.S., 1997. "Disciplined Discretion: Monetary Targeting in Germany and Switzerland," Princeton Essays in International Economics 206, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
    9. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Destabilizing effects of exchange-rate escape clauses," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 61-77, August.
    10. Alexius, Annika, 1999. "Inflation rules with consistent escape clauses," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 509-523, March.
    11. von Hagen, J, 1995. "Inflation and Monetary Targeting in Germany," Papers 03, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies-.
    12. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
    13. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
    14. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Q. Farooq Akram & Ragnar Nymoen, 2009. "Model Selection for Monetary Policy Analysis: How Important is Empirical Validity?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 71(1), pages 35-68, February.
    2. Alberto Locarno, 2007. "Imperfect Knowledge, Adaptive Learning, and the Bias Against Activist Monetary Policies," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 47-85, September.
    3. Zeno Rotondi & Giacomo Vaciago, 2007. "Lessons from the ECB experience: Frankfurt still matters!," DISCE - Quaderni dell'Istituto di Economia e Finanza ief0070, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    4. Q. Farooq Akram & Ragnar Nymoen, 2006. "Model selection for monetary policy analysis – Importance of empirical validity," Working Paper 2006/13, Norges Bank.
    5. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2009. "From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/6, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    european central bank; lexicographic preferences; monetary policy; time inconsistency;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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