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Bank centralny w świetle teorii agencji

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  • Wojtyna, Andrzej

Abstract

The article is devoted to possibilities of applying agency theory in research into efficiency of institutional solutions in central banks. Its first part presents factors due to which, like in many other cases of agency relationship, it is also in reference to central bank that drawing up appropriate practical solutions turns out to be a very complicated task giving rise giving rise to alot of controversy and even political emotions. The second part of the article is focused on those tenets of theoretical research, which while treating the central bank as an agent aim at an optimum contract allowing central bank independence to be tied with requirements for its democratic accountability. In the third part, emphasis is put on agency relations within the central bank. It discusses the results of numerous studies of various aspects of efficiency of making central banks’ decisions by committees. In conclusions of this article several remarks are made about possibilities of applying agency theory in analyses of institutional solutions adopted in the National Bank of Poland.

Suggested Citation

  • Wojtyna, Andrzej, 2004. "Bank centralny w świetle teorii agencji," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2004(9), September.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:polgne:355485
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.355485
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665.
    2. Carl E. Walsh, 1995. "Recent Central-Bank Reforms and the Role of Price Stability as the Sole Objective of Monetary Policy," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 237-252, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Al-Nowaihi, A & Levine, Paul L, 1996. "Independent but Accountable: Walsh Contracts and the Credibility Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 1387, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Ilian Mihov & Anne Sibert, 2002. "Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees," Working Papers 232002, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    5. Eric Schaling & Marco Hoeberichts & Sylvester Eijffinger, 1998. "Incentive schemes for central bankers under uncertainty: inflation targets versus contracts," Bank of England working papers 88, Bank of England.
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