Leviathan in the Crosshairs
Following in the spirit of the Leviathan hypothesis, this paper empirically examines how the degree of local government market power influences efficiency in the local public sector. Market power is measured by the number and relative size distribution of similar government units in the same market area. To avoid confusing market power with the comparative efficiency or superiority of larger sized organizations, the relative size distribution of the individual government unit is held constant in the empirical analysis. In the empirical test, aggregate property values serve as the measure of efficiency. The empirical results suggest that aggregate property values are lower and thus efficiency suffers, in more concentrated municipal market areas, ceteris paribus, thus providing some evidence for Leviathan-type governments in Connecticut. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006
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Volume (Year): 127 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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