Exerting local tax effort or lobbying for central transfers?: Evidence from Argentina
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- von Hagen, Jürgen & Hepp, Ralf, 2000.
"Regional risksharing and redistribution in the German federation,"
ZEI Working Papers
B 15-2000, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
- Hepp, Ralf & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2001. "Regional Risksharing and Redistribution in the German Federation," CEPR Discussion Papers 2662, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Prud'homme, Remy, 1995. "The Dangers of Decentralization," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 10(2), pages 201-220, August.
- Isa Sagbas, 2001. "An econometric analysis of local fiscal response to revenue sharing in Turkey," Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Pion Ltd, London, vol. 19(1), pages 85-101, February.
- Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, 2001.
"Optimal Regional Redistribution under Asymmetric Information,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 709-723, June.
- Massimo Bordignon & Paolo Manasse & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Optimal Regional Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 93, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Bordignon, Massimo & Manasse, Paolo & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Optimal Regional Redistribution Under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 1437, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mariano Tommasi & Sebastian Saiegh & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001.
"Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform,"
The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 157-212, January.
- Mariano Tommasi & Sebastian M. Saiegh & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2001. "Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform," Working Papers 32, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised May 2001.
- Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986.
"The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement,"
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
- Graetz, Michael J. & Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., "undated". "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," Working Papers 589, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Bernd Huber & Christian Baretti & Karl Lichtblau, 2000. "A Tax on Tax Revenue. The Incentive Effects of Equalizing Transfers: Evidence from Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 333, CESifo Group Munich.
- Michael Smart, 1998. "Taxation and Deadweight Loss in a System of Intergovernmental Transfers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(1), pages 189-206, February.
- Jones, Mark P. & Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2000. "Politics, institutions, and fiscal performance in a federal system: an analysis of the Argentine provinces," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 305-333, April.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Yongzheng Liu & Jianmei Zhao, 2011. "Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and local tax efforts: evidence from provinces in China," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(4), pages 295-300, December.
- Prasant Kumar Panda & Velan Nirmala, 2013. "Central Fiscal Transfers and States' Spending In India: An Analysis of Incentive Effect," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1229-1246.
- Abdul Jalil, Ahmad Zafarullah & Abdul Karim, Noor Al-Huda, 2009. "Understanding Malaysian State Governments Fiscal Behavior: The Role of Intergovernmental Transfers," MPRA Paper 25188, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Abdul Jalil, Ahmad Zafarullah, 2009. "Decentralization, Subnational Governments' Behaviour and Macroeconomic Instability: The Case of Malaysia," MPRA Paper 19071, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywordslocal tax effort - discretionary transfers - tax enforcement;
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2006-06-03 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-PBE-2006-06-03 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2006-06-03 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:latm04:249. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.