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Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions

Author

Listed:
  • Amihai Glazer

    () (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Hiroki Kondo

    () (Department of Economics, Shinshu University)

Abstract

We consider cities which can increase the income of landowners or of capital owners by improving the quality of public services. The improvement can come from innovation or from imitation. We find that when cities aim to benefit landowners, too many cities innovate; but too few cities innovate when the city aims to benefit capital owners. Redistribution across cities can ameliorate these inefficiencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Amihai Glazer & Hiroki Kondo, 2007. "Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions," Working Papers 070807, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:070807
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    File URL: https://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2007-08/glazer-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax competition; Innovation; Interjurisdictional differences;

    JEL classification:

    • R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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