IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/usg/dp2003/2003-14.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Diffusion of Policy Innovations. An Experimental Investigation

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Robert Tyran

    ()

  • Rupert Sausgruber

    ()

Abstract

What causes a government to adopt a new program or policy? Despite a large number of empirical studies available to date, the relative importance of various determinants remains obscure because of difficulties of statistical identification. We present an experimental setting to study the diffusion of policy innovations in the laboratory. Our approach discriminates between experimentation, experience, and emulation as determinants of policy adoption. The policy innovation we study is an internalization tax to mitigate a local market externality. Our results demonstrate the importance of information about innovations in other states in the diffusion of policy innovations.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Robert Tyran & Rupert Sausgruber, 2003. "The Diffusion of Policy Innovations. An Experimental Investigation," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2003 2003-14, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  • Handle: RePEc:usg:dp2003:2003-14
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2003/dp0314tyran_ganz.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
    2. Helen F. Ladd, 1992. "Mimicking of Local Tax Burdens Among Neighboring Counties," Public Finance Review, , vol. 20(4), pages 450-467, October.
    3. Harrison, Glenn W, et al, 1987. "Coasian Solutions to the Externality Problem in Experimental Marke ts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(386), pages 388-402, June.
    4. Kollman, Ken & Miller, John H & Page, Scott E, 2000. "Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 102-128, April.
    5. repec:cup:apsrev:v:63:y:1969:i:03:p:880-899_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:01:p:178-194_22 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Heyndels, Bruno & Vuchelen, Jef, 1998. "Tax Mimicking Among Belgian Municipalities," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(1), pages 89-101, March.
    8. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Political Uncertainty and Policy Innovation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(5), pages 779-805, December.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:71:y:1977:i:02:p:441-447_26 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Heyndels, Bruno & Vuchelen, Jef, 1998. "Tax Mimicking Among Belgian Municipalities," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 1), pages 89-101, March.
    11. Smith, Vernon L, et al, 1982. "Competitive Market Institutions: Double Auctions vs. Sealed Bid-Offer Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 58-77, March.
    12. repec:cup:apsrev:v:63:y:1969:i:03:p:880-899_25 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-1155, December.
    14. Case, Anne C. & Rosen, Harvey S. & Hines, James Jr., 1993. "Budget spillovers and fiscal policy interdependence : Evidence from the states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 285-307, October.
    15. Feld, Lars P., 1997. "Exit, voice and income taxes: The loyalty of voters," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 455-478, September.
    16. Strumpf, Koleman S, 2002. " Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(2), pages 207-241.
    17. Plott, Charles R, 1983. "Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(369), pages 106-127, March.
    18. repec:cup:apsrev:v:84:y:1990:i:02:p:395-415_19 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Kollman, Ken & Miller, John H & Page, Scott E, 1997. "Political Institutions and Sorting in a Tiebout Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 977-992, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tiezzi, Silvia & Xiao, Erte, 2016. "Time delay, complexity and support for taxation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 117-141.
    2. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2015. "Tax mimicking in the short- and long-run: Evidence from German reunification," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 230, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    3. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2015. "Tax mimicking in the short- and the long-run: Evidence from German reunification," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113088, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Tiezzi, Silvia & Xiao, Erte, 2013. "Time Delay and Support for Taxation," MPRA Paper 51233, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Lars P. Feld, 2006. "Regulatory Competition and Federalism in Switzerland: Diffusion by Horizontal and Vertical Interaction," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-22, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policy emulation; policy experimentation; innovation;

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usg:dp2003:2003-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joerg Baumberger). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vwasgch.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.