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Fiscal Decentralization and Voters' Choices as Control

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  • Alberto Porto
  • Natalia Porto

Abstract

This paper investigates, empirically, the voters' choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance. The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal centralization.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Porto & Natalia Porto, 2000. "Fiscal Decentralization and Voters' Choices as Control," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(1), pages 135-167, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:recsxx:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:135-167
    DOI: 10.1080/15140326.2000.12040548
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    Cited by:

    1. World Bank, 2003. "Decentralizing Indonesia : A Regional Public Expenditure Review Overview Report," World Bank Publications - Reports 14632, The World Bank Group.
    2. Alberto Porto, 2004. "Finanzas Públicas Locales en la Argentina," IIE, Working Papers 057, IIE, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
    3. Ricardo Duque Gabriel, 2020. "Who should you vote for? Empirical evidence from Portuguese local governments," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 19(1), pages 5-31, January.
    4. Klein, Fabio Alvim & Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, 2015. "Term limits and political budget cycles at the local level: evidence from a young democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 21-36.
    5. Daniel Kaufmann & Gil Mehrez & Tugrul Gurgur, 2019. "Voice or public sector management? An empirical investigation of determinants of public sector performance based on a survey of public officials," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 321-348, January.
    6. Alberto Porto & Natalia Porto, 2000. "Influencia de las condiciones económicas y fiscales sobre los resultados electorales provinciales y municipales," Department of Economics, Working Papers 026, Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.
    7. José Carlos Ferreira Da Silva & Vander Mendes Lucas & Moisés De Andrade Resende Filho, 2014. "Royalties Do Petróleo E Eleições Municipais: O Caso Brasileiro," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41st Brazilian Economics Meeting] 078, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    8. Fabio Alvim Klein, 2014. "Do Opportunistic And Partisan Fiscalcycles Come Together?," Anais do XL Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 40th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 060, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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