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Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-GameBetween Terrorists and the Media

Author

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  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Dominik Rohner

Abstract

It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on this issue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The present contribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the social interactions between terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game and results in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, an empirical analysis is performed. Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to be �bloodier� in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey & Dominik Rohner, 2006. "Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-GameBetween Terrorists and the Media," IEW - Working Papers 285, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:285
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    File URL: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp_iew/iewwp285.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michelle Slone, 2000. "Responses to Media Coverage of Terrorism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(4), pages 508-522, August.
    2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
    3. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-44, January.
    4. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    5. Matthew A. Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2004. "Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 117-133, Summer.
    6. David P. Myatt & Hyun Song Shin & Chris Wallace, 2002. "The Assessment: Games and Coordination," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 397-417.
    7. John Scott, 2001. "Media congestion limits media terrorism," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 215-227.
    8. Vega-Redondo,Fernando, 2003. "Economics and the Theory of Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521775908, August.
    9. Frey, Bruno S. & Luechinger, Simon, 2004. "Decentralization as a disincentive for terror," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 509-515, June.
    10. Bruno S. Frey, 2004. "Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot?," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3435.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terrorism; media; common-interest-game; coordination; conflict;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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