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Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists and the Media

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  • Bruno S. Frey
  • Dominic Rohner

Abstract

It has often been pointed out in the literature that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorist groups and the media. As yet, however, no formal model has been built based on this issue and only very little empirical research has been done in this field. The present contribution builds a simple game theoretic model, focussing on the social interactions between terrorists and the media. The model has features of a common-interest-game and results in multiple equilibria. After a discussion of the policy implications of the model, an empirical analysis is performed. Using newspaper coverage, terror incidents and terror fatalities data, it is shown that media attention and terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other, as predicted by the model. Moreover, it is explained why terror attacks tend to be ?bloodier? in developing countries than in Europe and the United States.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruno S. Frey & Dominic Rohner, 2006. "Blood and Ink! The Common-Interest-Game Between Terrorists and the Media," CREMA Working Paper Series 2006-08, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  • Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2006-08
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michelle Slone, 2000. "Responses to Media Coverage of Terrorism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 44(4), pages 508-522, August.
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    5. Matthew A. Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2004. "Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 117-133, Summer.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terrorism; media; common-interest-game; coordination; conflict;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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