Do Institutions of Direct Democracy Tame the Leviathan? Swiss Evidence on the Structure of Expenditure for Public Education
Identification of a deleterious impact of institutions of direct legislation on student performance by studies for both the U.S. and Switzerland has raised the question of the exact transmission channels for this impact. Studies for the U.S. that find an increase in the ratio of administrative to instructional spending and larger class sizes support the hypothesis of a Leviathan-like school administration. However, research for Switzerland using a time-series panel of sub-federal school expenditure and class size detects no such effect. These findings are in line with previous analyses that identify efficiency gains in the provision of public goods for Switzerland. Version: 7 Dec 2005
|Date of creation:||Dec 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +41 71 224 23 25
Fax: +41 71 224 31 35
Web page: http://www.seps.unisg.ch/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robert B. Archibald & David H. Feldman, 2004.
"State Higher Education Spending and the Tax Revolt,"
10, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
- Robert B Archibald & David H Feldman, 2004. "State Higher Education Spending and the Tax Revolt," HEW 0412003, EconWPA.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1998. "Sources of Inefficiency in a Representative Democracy: A Dynamic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 139-56, March.
- Shadbegian, Ronald J., 1999. "The Effect of Tax and Expenditure Limitations on the Revenue Structure of Local Government, 1962-87," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 221-38, June.
- Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
- Ronald J. Shadbegian, 2000. "Did the property tax revolt affect local government wages and employment? Evidence from the States," Global Business and Economics Review, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(1), pages 104-120.
- Lars P. Feld & Gebhard Kirchgassner, 1999. "Public Debt and Budgetary Procedures: Top Down or Bottom Up? Some Evidence from Swiss Municipalities," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 151-180 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
- Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 563-87, November.
- Figlio, David N & O'Sullivan, Arthur, 2001. "The Local Response to Tax Limitation Measures: Do Local Governments Manipulate Voters to Increase Revenues?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 233-57, April.
- Poterba, James M & Rueben, Kim S, 1995. "The Effect of Property-Tax Limits on Wages and Employment in the Local Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 384-89, May.
- Figlio, David N., 1998. "Short-Term Effects of a 1990s-Era Property Tax Limit: Panel Evidence on Oregon's Measure 5," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 1), pages 55-70, March.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1997.
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114, February.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," Penn CARESS Working Papers ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, . ""An Economic Model of Representative Democracy''," CARESS Working Papres 95-02, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Card, David & Payne, A. Abigail, 2002. "School finance reform, the distribution of school spending, and the distribution of student test scores," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 49-82, January.
- Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-64, August.
- Justina A.V. Fischer, 2005. "The Impact of Direct Democracy on Public Education: Performance of Swiss Students in Reading," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 2005-10, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
- Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-43, December.
- Dye, Richard F. & McGuire, Therese J., 1997. "The effect of property tax limitation measures on local government fiscal behavior," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 469-487, December.
- Ronald J. Shadbegian, 2003. "Did the Property Tax Revolt Affect Local Public Education? Evidence From Panel Data," Public Finance Review, , vol. 31(1), pages 91-121, January.
- Downes, Thomas A. & Dye, Richard F. & McGuire, Therese J., 1998. "Do Limits Matter? Evidence on the Effects of Tax Limitations on Student Performance," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 401-417, May.
- Figlio, David N., 1997. "Teacher salaries and teacher quality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 267-271, August.
- Figlio, David N. & Rueben, Kim S., 2001. "Tax limits and the qualifications of new teachers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 49-71, April.
- Feld, Lars P. & Matsusaka, John G., 2003. "Budget referendums and government spending: evidence from Swiss cantons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2703-2724, December.
- Thomas Downes & David Figlio, 1998.
"School Finance Reforms, Tax Limits, and Student Performance: Do Reforms Level-Up or Dumb Down?,"
Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University
9805, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- T. A. Downes & D. N. Figlio, . "School Finance Reforms, Tax Limits, and Student Performance: Do Reforms Level Up or Dumb Down?," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1142-97, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
- Bradbury, Katharine L. & Mayer, Christopher J. & Case, Karl E., 2001. "Property tax limits, local fiscal behavior, and property values: evidence from Massachusetts under Proposition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 287-311, May.
- Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2000. "Wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen der direkten Demokratie," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(2), pages 161-180, 05.
- Volkerink, Bjorn & De Haan, Jakob, 2001. " Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 109(3-4), pages 221-42, December.
- Downes, Thomas A, 1996. " An Examination of the Structure of Governance in California School Districts before and after Proposition 13," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 86(3-4), pages 279-307, March.
- Feld, Lars P & Savioz, Marcel R, 1997. "Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 507-38.
- Figlio, David N., 1997. "Did the "tax revolt" reduce school performance?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 245-269, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usg:dp2005:2005-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joerg Baumberger)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.