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Terrorism and electoral accountability: One strike, you're out!

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  • Gassebner, Martin
  • Jong-A-Pin, Richard
  • Mierau, Jochen O.

Abstract

We examine the relationship between terrorism and electoral accountability. We find that terror has a robust positive effect on the probability that the incumbent government is replaced. The magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the terrorist attack.

Suggested Citation

  • Gassebner, Martin & Jong-A-Pin, Richard & Mierau, Jochen O., 2008. "Terrorism and electoral accountability: One strike, you're out!," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 126-129, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:126-129
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