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Monopolizacja władzy a wyniki gospodarcze na poziomie Polski lokalnej

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  • Fałkowski, Jan
  • Bukowska, Grażyna

Abstract

The article analyzes the effects that the monopolization of power has on various socioeconomic processes in rural areas in Poland. Using a simple econometric model, the authors compare areas in which the same individuals were in power from 1990 to 2010 with areas where such a monopoly of power was not in evidence. The article looks at how these two types of rural districts differ from each other in terms of unemployment, the structure of the local budget, and the participation of citizens in local elections. The empirical results suggest that the monopolization of power at the local level does not significantly affect economic outcomes. However, power monopolies seem to translate into declining voter turnout. Taken together, these results raise questions about the functioning of political selection mechanisms and about the potential risk of local elites capturing the political system.

Suggested Citation

  • Fałkowski, Jan & Bukowska, Grażyna, 2016. "Monopolizacja władzy a wyniki gospodarcze na poziomie Polski lokalnej," Gospodarka Narodowa-The Polish Journal of Economics, Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie / SGH Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 2016(2), April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:polgne:359063
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.359063
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