Political Selection and the Quality of Evidence: Evidence form South India
This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics aÂ®ect politician behavior while in oÂ±ce. Education increases the chances of selection to public oÂ±ce and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not aÂ®ect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alters the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information Â°ows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.
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