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Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries

  • Pande, Rohini

Building on the large and growing empirical literature on the political behavior of individuals in low income countries, this Chapter seeks to understand corruption through the lens of political economy - particularly in terms of the political and economic differences between rich and poor countries. Our focus is on the political behavior of individuals exposed to democratic political institutions. We review the existing literature on the determinants of individual political behavior to ask whether we can understand the choice of political actors to be corrupt and, importantly, of other individuals to permit it, as a rational response to the social or the economic environment they inhabit. We also discuss the implications of this view of corruption for anti-corruption policies.

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This chapter was published in:
  • T. Paul Schultz & John A. Strauss (ed.), 2008. "Handbook of Development Economics," Handbook of Development Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 4, number 5, January.
  • This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Development Economics with number 5-50.
    Handle: RePEc:eee:devchp:5-50
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description

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