Political Parties and the Tax Level in the American states: Two Regression Discontinuity Designs
Do parties matter? Yes, but not in the usual way we tend to think of them: big government Democrats and small government Republicans. Our first regression discontinuity design shows that whether the majority in the House of Representatives is Republican or Democratic does not affect the tax level. This surprising result goes against the recent literature in political economy. We then perform another regression discontinuity design in which we find that whether a government is aligned (both the Governor and the majority in the state House belong to the same party) or divided (they belong to different parties) does have an effect on the tax level. Taxes are higher when the government is aligned.
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- Solé-Ollé, Albert & Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, 2008.
"The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2302-2319, December.
- Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2006. "The Effects of Partisan Alignment on the Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers. Differences-in-Differences Estimates for Spain," CESifo Working Paper Series 1855, CESifo Group Munich.
- Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2006. "The effects of partisan alignment on the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain," Working Papers 2006-09, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
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