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James A Dearden

Personal Details

First Name:James
Middle Name:A
Last Name:Dearden
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pde315
http://www3.lehigh.edu/business/faculty/dearden.asp

Affiliation

Economics Department
College of Business and Economics
Lehigh University

Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (United States)
http://cbe.lehigh.edu/economics

:


RePEc:edi:eclehus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Editorship

Working papers

  1. Jim Dearden & Rajdeep Grewal & Gary Lilien, 2006. "Merit Aid and Competition in the University Marketplace," Working Papers 9602, Lehigh University, Department of Economics, revised May 2007.
  2. Dearden, J. & Ickes, B.W. & Samuelson, L., 1988. "To Innovate Or Not To Innovate: Incentives And Innovation In Hierarchies," Papers 0-88-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. J. Aronson & James Dearden & Vincent Munley, 2009. "The impact of surplus sharing on the portfolio mix of public sector defined benefit pension plans: a public choice approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 161-184, July.
  2. Grewal, Rajdeep & Dearden, James A. & Lilien, Gary L., 2008. "The University Rankings Game: Modeling the Competition Among Universities for Ranking," The American Statistician, American Statistical Association, vol. 62, pages 232-237, August.
  3. Dearden James A, 2006. "Voice-over-PowerPoint Recordings," Journal of Industrial Organization Education, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-2, December.
  4. James Dearden & Karl Einolf, 2003. "Strategy-proof allocation of fixed costs," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(2), pages 185-204, October.
  5. James A. Dearden & Dorothy E. Klotz, 2002. "Contracting, Gatekeepers, and Unverifiable Performance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 723-739, Winter.
  6. James Dearden & Larry Taylor & Robert Thornton, 2001. "A Benchmark Profile of Economics Departments in 15 Private Universities," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 387-396, January.
  7. James A. Dearden, 1998. "Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(1), pages 189-198.
  8. Dearden, James A., 1997. "Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 153-174, October.
  9. James Dearden & Dorothy Klotz, 1996. "Investment timing and efficiency in incomplete contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 369-378, December.
  10. Dearden, James A & Schap, David, 1994. "The First Word and the Last Word in the Budgetary Process: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Proposal and Veto Authorities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 35-53, October.
  11. Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 707-723, December.
  12. Dearden, James A., 1991. "Efficiency in spatial negotiations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 119-130, February.
  13. Dearden, James A, 1991. "Efficiency and Disagreement in Repeated Infinite Horizon Bargaining Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(2), pages 267-277, May.
  14. Dearden, James & Ickes, Barry W & Samuelson, Larry, 1990. "To Innovate or Not to Innovate: Incentives and Innovation in Hierarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1105-1124, December.
  15. Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1990. "Executive Budget Proposal, Executive Veto, Legislative Override, and Uncertainty: A Comparative Analysis of the Budgetary Process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 1-19, April.

Editorship

  1. Journal of Industrial Organization Education, De Gruyter.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Dearden, J. & Ickes, B.W. & Samuelson, L., 1988. "To Innovate Or Not To Innovate: Incentives And Innovation In Hierarchies," Papers 0-88-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. David Atkin & Azam Chaudhry & Shamyla Chaudry & Amit K. Khandelwal & Eric Verhoogen, 2017. "Organizational Barriers to Technology Adoption: Evidence from Soccer-Ball Producers in Pakistan," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(3), pages 1101-1164.
    2. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter J. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2008. "Competition and the Ratchet Effect," IZA Discussion Papers 3784, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    3. Walter Buhr, 2009. "Infrastructure of the Market Economy," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 132-09, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    4. Dominique Demougin & Anja Schöttner, 2010. "Technology adoption under hidden information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 100(1), pages 1-18, May.
    5. AMBEC, Stefan & POITEVIN, Michel, 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D Activities," Cahiers de recherche 2001-12, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    6. Fung, Ka Wai Terence & Lau, Chi Keung Marco & Chan, Kwok Ho, 2013. "A R&D Based Real Business Cycle Model," MPRA Paper 52571, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2016. "Testing for the Ratchet Effect: Evidence from a Real-Effort Work Task," IZA Discussion Papers 9981, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    8. James D. Adams & J. Roger Clemmons, 2013. "How Rapidly Does Science Leak Out? A Study of the Diffusion of Fundamental Ideas," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 7(3), pages 191-229.
    9. Hao Li, 2001. "A Theory of Conservatism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 617-636, June.
    10. Alessandro Rossi, 2001. "The Effective Design of Managerial Incentive Systems: Combining Theoretical Principlesand Practical Trade-offs," ROCK Working Papers 015, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 12 Jun 2008.
    11. Brown, Annette N. & Ickes, Barry W. & Ryterman, Randi, 1994. "Russian Federation - The myth of monopoly : a new view of industrial structure in Russia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1331, The World Bank.
    12. James D. Adams & J. Roger Clemmons & Paula E. Stephan, 2006. "How Rapidly Does Science Leak Out?," Rensselaer Working Papers in Economics 0612, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Department of Economics.
    13. Chatalova, Lioudmila & Djanibekov, Nodir & Gagalyuk, Taras & Valentinov, Vladislav, 2017. "The paradox of water management projects in Central Asia: An institutionalist perspective," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 1-14.
    14. Sofia Moroni, 2016. "Experimentation in Organizations," Working Paper 5876, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    15. Joseph Persky, 1991. "Retrospectives: Lange and von Mises, Large-Scale Enterprises, and the Economic Case for Socialism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 229-236, Fall.
    16. Sergei Guriev & Barry W. Ickes, 2000. "Microeconomic Aspects of Economic Growth in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1950-2000," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 348, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    17. David J. Cooper, 1999. "Gaming against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 781-804, September.
    18. James D Adams & Adam B Jaffe, 1994. "The Span of the Effect of R&D in the Firm and Industry," Working Papers 94-7, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    19. Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2018. "Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-effort work task," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 182-202.

Articles

  1. Grewal, Rajdeep & Dearden, James A. & Lilien, Gary L., 2008. "The University Rankings Game: Modeling the Competition Among Universities for Ranking," The American Statistician, American Statistical Association, vol. 62, pages 232-237, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Jeongeun Kim, 2018. "The Functions and Dysfunctions of College Rankings: An Analysis of Institutional Expenditure," Research in Higher Education, Springer;Association for Institutional Research, vol. 59(1), pages 54-87, February.
    2. César Zamudio & Meg Meng, 2015. "Which Modeling Scholars Get Promoted, and How Fast?," Customer Needs and Solutions, Springer;Institute for Sustainable Innovation and Growth (iSIG), vol. 2(1), pages 91-104, March.
    3. Abe, Yasumi & Watanabe, Satoshi P., 2012. "A NEW APPROACH TO ANALYZING UNIVERSITY PRESTIGE AND INTERNAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION: Geometric Interpretations and Implications," University of California at Berkeley, Center for Studies in Higher Education qt2tz763xp, Center for Studies in Higher Education, UC Berkeley.
    4. Surendra Rajiv & Junhong Chu & Zhiying Jiang, 2015. "Publication, Citation, Career Development, and Recent Trends: Empirical Evidence for Quantitative Marketing Researchers," Customer Needs and Solutions, Springer;Institute for Sustainable Innovation and Growth (iSIG), vol. 2(1), pages 71-90, March.
    5. Ellen Hazelkorn, 2011. "Measuring World-class Excellence and the Global Obsession with Rankings," Chapters,in: Handbook on Globalization and Higher Education, chapter 29 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Christopher Claassen, 2015. "Measuring university quality," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 104(3), pages 793-807, September.
    7. Roger King & Simon Marginson & Rajani Naidoo (ed.), 2011. "Handbook on Globalization and Higher Education," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13590.
    8. Andrea Bonaccorsi & Cinzia Daraio, 2014. "Beyond university rankings ? Generating new indicators on European universities by linking data in open platforms," DIAG Technical Reports 2014-12, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza".

  2. James Dearden & Karl Einolf, 2003. "Strategy-proof allocation of fixed costs," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(2), pages 185-204, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2005. "Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-33, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
    2. Michael R. Galbreth & Bikram Ghosh & Mikhael Shor, 2012. "Social Sharing of Information Goods: Implications for Pricing and Profits," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(4), pages 603-620, July.

  3. James Dearden & Larry Taylor & Robert Thornton, 2001. "A Benchmark Profile of Economics Departments in 15 Private Universities," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 387-396, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Henrique Monteiro & Alexandra Ferreira Lopes, 2007. "A Benchmarking of the Undergraduate Economics Major in Europe and the United States," International Review of Economic Education, Economics Network, University of Bristol, vol. 6(2), pages 9-26.
    2. Alexis Walckiers, 2008. "Multi-dimensional contracts with task-specific productivity: an application to universities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(2), pages 165-198, April.

  4. James A. Dearden, 1998. "Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(1), pages 189-198.

    Cited by:

    1. Maniquet, François & Sprumont, Yves, 2010. "Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 275-302, January.
    2. Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188.
    3. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2011. "Strategy-Proof Rules for an Excludable Public Good," Discussion Papers 1118, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
    4. Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.

  5. Dearden, James A., 1997. "Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 153-174, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Deb, Rajat & Ghosh, Indranil K. & Seo, Tae Kun, 2002. "Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 209-224, March.
    2. Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188.
    3. Birulin, Oleksii, 2006. "Public goods with congestion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 289-299, July.
    4. R. J. Gary-Bobo & T. Jaaidane, 1996. "Polling mechanisms and the demand revelation problem," THEMA Working Papers 96-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    5. Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    6. Pérez-Nievas, Mikel, 2000. "Interim efficient allocation mechanisms," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7220, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    7. Pérez-Nievas, Mikel, 2000. "Interim efficient mechanisms for a public decision making in a discrete framework," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7221, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

  6. James Dearden & Dorothy Klotz, 1996. "Investment timing and efficiency in incomplete contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 369-378, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Klaus Schmidt, 1998. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," CESifo Working Paper Series 160, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Evelina Mengova, 2014. "Quality of Institutions and Outsourcing," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), pages 639-659, December.
    3. Tai-Yeong Chung & Alan Chan, 2004. "Contract Damages and Investment Dynamics," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 683, Econometric Society.

  7. Dearden, James A & Schap, David, 1994. "The First Word and the Last Word in the Budgetary Process: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Proposal and Veto Authorities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(1-2), pages 35-53, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.

  8. Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 707-723, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Samuel Baker, 2000. "Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 63-79, July.
    2. de Figueiredo, Rui Jr., 2003. "Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2677-2701, December.
    3. Thomas P. Lauth, 2016. "The Other Six: Governors Without The Line-Item Veto," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 26-49, December.
    4. Aidt, T.S. & Giovannoni,F., 2005. "Critical Decisions and Constitutional Rules," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0523, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Leandro M. De Magalhães & Lucas Ferrero, 2010. "Separation of Powers and the Tax Level in the U.S. States," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 14/620, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK, revised Dec 2014.
    6. John A. Dove, 2017. "Property Tax Limits, Balanced Budget Rules, and Line-Item Vetoes: A Long-Run View," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 43(2), pages 288-317, March.

  9. Dearden, James A, 1991. "Efficiency and Disagreement in Repeated Infinite Horizon Bargaining Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(2), pages 267-277, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Dearden, James A., 1997. "Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 153-174, October.

  10. Dearden, James & Ickes, Barry W & Samuelson, Larry, 1990. "To Innovate or Not to Innovate: Incentives and Innovation in Hierarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1105-1124, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  11. Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1990. "Executive Budget Proposal, Executive Veto, Legislative Override, and Uncertainty: A Comparative Analysis of the Budgetary Process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(1), pages 1-19, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Samuel Baker, 2000. "Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 63-79, July.
    2. Thomas P. Lauth, 2016. "The Other Six: Governors Without The Line-Item Veto," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 26-49, December.
    3. Dearden, James A & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "Do Governors Get What They Want?: An Alternative Examination of the Line-Item Veto," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 707-723, December.

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