IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v12y1998i1p189-198.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions

Author

Listed:
  • James A. Dearden

    (Department of Economics, 621 Taylor Street, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015, USA)

Abstract

A group of individuals meet to share the cost and determine output allocations of a partial-excludable public good. We demonstrate that, for general cost functions and preferences that satisfy the Spence-Mirlees sorting condition, the serial cost-sharing formula (Moulin, 1994) has remarkable incentive properties. First, a direct economic mechanism that uses the serial formula is coalition strategy-proof, envy-free and satisfies the stand-alone property. Second, the serial mechanism involves partial exclusion, which is important for the reduction of the free-rider problem.

Suggested Citation

  • James A. Dearden, 1998. "Serial cost sharing of excludable public goods: general cost functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(1), pages 189-198.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:12:y:1998:i:1:p:189-198
    Note: Received: June 10, 1996; revised version; February 11, 1997
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/8012001/80120189.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/8012001/80120189.ps.gz
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maniquet, François & Sprumont, Yves, 2010. "Sharing the cost of a public good: An incentive-constrained axiomatic approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 275-302, January.
    2. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2016. "Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 749-766, April.
    3. Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188.
    4. Norman,P., 2000. "Efficient mechanisms for public goods with use exclusions," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:12:y:1998:i:1:p:189-198. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.