Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
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- Duggan, John, 2011. "General conditions for the existence of maximal elements via the uncovered set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 755-759.
- Hideo Konishi, 1996. "Equilibrium in abstract political economies: with an application to a public good economy with voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 13(1), pages 43-50, January.
- David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1999. "Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 663-672.
- Norman Schofield, 2013. "The “probability of a fit choice”," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(2), pages 129-150, June.
- Banks, Jeffrey S., 1995. "Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 523-536.
- Diffo Lambo, Lawrence & Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Wambo, Pierre, 2015. "Networked politics: political cycles and instability under social influences," MPRA Paper 65641, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Macartan Humphreys, 2008. "Existence of a multicameral core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 503-520, October.
- Diffo Lambo, Lawrence & Pongou, Roland & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Wambo, Pierre, 2015. "Networked Politics: Political Cycles and Instability under Social Influences," MPRA Paper 65598, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Elizabeth Maggie Penn, 2015. "Arrow’s Theorem and its descendants," Chapters,in: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 14, pages 237-262 Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Norman Schofield, 1986. "Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 267-284, January.
- Chakravorti, Bhaskar, 1999. "Far-Sightedness and the Voting Paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 216-226, February.
- Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2004. "Group Formation with Heterogeneous Sets," IDEI Working Papers 288, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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