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Existence of a multicameral core

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  • Macartan Humphreys

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  • Macartan Humphreys, 2008. "Existence of a multicameral core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 503-520, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:31:y:2008:i:3:p:503-520
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0293-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
    2. Schofield, Norman, 1984. "Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 59-71, June.
    3. Hammond, Thomas H. & Miller, Gary J., 1987. "The Core of the Constitution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1155-1174, December.
    4. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman & Nicholas Miller, 1988. "Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 37-50, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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