Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results
Evolutionary game theory informs the design and analysis of twenty-six experimental sessions using normal form games with six to twenty-four players. The state typically converges to the subset of Nash equilibria called evolutionary equilibria, especially under conditions of mean matching and history. Mixed strategy equilibria are explained better by 'purification' strategies than by homogenous independent individual randomization. The risk dominance criterion fares poorly in some coordination game environments. With small player populations and large gains to cooperative behavior, some players apparently attempt to influence other players' actions, contrary to a key theoretical assumption. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 106 (1996)
Issue (Month): 434 (January)
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