Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
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Volume (Year): 35 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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- Dan Ashlock & Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Leigh Tesfatsion, 1995.
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Game Theory and Information
9501002, EconWPA, revised 20 Jan 1995.
- Ashlock, Daniel & Smucker, Mark D. & Stanley, E. Ann & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 1996. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Staff General Research Papers 1687, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 1047-1079
- Herbert Dawid and Bentley MacLeod, 2001. "Holdup and the Evolution of Bargaining Conventions," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 104, Society for Computational Economics.
- Robles, Jack, 2001. "Evolution in Finitely Repeated Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 312-330, February.
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