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Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games

  • Sonja Brangewitz

    ()

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Jan-Philip Gamp

    ()

    (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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    We investigate the relationship between certain subsets of the core for TU market games and competitive payoff vectors of certain markets linked to that game. This can be considered as the case in between the two extreme cases of Shapley and Shubik (1975). They remark already that their result can be extended to any closed convex subset of the core, but they omit the details of the proof which we present here. This more general case is in particular interesting, as the two theorems of Shapley and Shubik (1975) are included as special cases.

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    File Function: First version, 2011
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    Paper provided by Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University in its series Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers with number 454.

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    Length: 14 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:454
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld
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    Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/

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    1. Sonja Brangewitz & Jan-Philip Gamp, 2011. "Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 449, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Tomoki Inoue, 2010. "Representation of TU games by coalition production economies," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 430, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    3. Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "A Conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of NTU Market Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 335-44.
    4. Sun,N. & Trockel,W. & Yang,Z., 2004. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 358, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    5. Shapley, Lloyd S. & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On market games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 9-25, June.
    6. Garratt, Rod & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2000. "On Market Games When Agents Cannot Be in Two Places at Once," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 165-173, May.
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