Game Theory via Revealed Preferences
We investigate equilibrium notions in game theory from the revealed preference approach. For extensive game forms with complete information, we derive a set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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- Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H., 1993.
"The consistency principle for games in strategic form,"
1993-6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 13-34.
- Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H., 1996. "The consistency principle for games in strategic form," Other publications TiSEM fc27db2d-b84c-44ba-95a1-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Peleg, B. & Tijs, S., 1993. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form," Papers 9306, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 205-232, August.
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