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Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games

  • Indra Ray
  • Susan Snyder

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2003-02.

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Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-02
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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