IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-01533674.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Imperfect communication in markets : a big world problem

Author

Listed:
  • Alan Kirman

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper examines the problem of markets where not all individuals are in contact with each other. The nature of the communication structure in a market is rarely made explicit in standard economic analysis although a structure is implicitly assumed in the description of the model. To take as an example the general equilibrium model of exchange, it is clear that in such a model each individual must receive price signals. Hence a structure which would correspond to the Walrasian description would be one in which each agent was in contact with a central auctioneer. Thus viewing the agents as nodes in a graph and denoting contact or communication between two individuals by an arc, the Walrasian model would correspond to a star-shaped graph. (...)

Suggested Citation

  • Alan Kirman, 1980. "Imperfect communication in markets : a big world problem," Working Papers hal-01533674, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01533674
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01533674
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-01533674/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hansen, Terje, 1969. "A Note on the Limit of the Core of an Exchange Economy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(3), pages 479-483, October.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jinpeng Ma, 1998. "Strategic Formation of Coalitions," Departmental Working Papers 199810, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    2. Zissimos, Ben, 2002. "WHY ARE TRADE AGREEMENTS REGIONAL? A Theory Based on Noncooperative Networks," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 652, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ghosal, Sayantan & Ray, Debraj, 2005. "Farsighted network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 143-164, June.
    4. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Weighted component fairness for forest games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 144-151.
    5. Martin Shubik, 1974. "The General Equilibrium Model: Barter and Trust, or Mass Markets with Money and Credit," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 50(2), pages 245-258, June.
    6. Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Rod Garratt & James E. Parco & Cheng-Zhong Qin & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Potential Maximization And Coalition Government Formation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 407-429.
    8. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Negotiating the membership," Game Theory and Information 0409003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Navarro, Noemí & Perea, Andrés, 2001. "Bargaining in networks and the myerson value," UC3M Working papers. Economics we016121, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    10. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
    11. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 0303011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Ostroy, Joseph M., 1980. "The no-surplus condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 183-207, April.
    13. Francis Bloch & Matt Jackson, 2004. "The Formation of Networks with Side Payments," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 198, Econometric Society.
    14. Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 242-264, October.
    15. Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005. "Strongly stable networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May.
    16. Rodrigo J. Harrison & Roberto Munoz, 2003. "Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game," Game Theory and Information 0306004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "On the Stability of Cooperation Structures," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 472.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    18. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. "Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
    19. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
    20. Sergio Currarini, 2003. "On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2003.19, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    market; economy;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01533674. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.