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On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players

  • Anindya Bhattacharya

    ()

  • Abderrahmane Ziad

    ()

In this paper we first explore the predictive power of the solution notion called conservative stable standard of behaviour (CSSB), introduced by Greenberg (1990) in environments with farsighted players (as modelled in Xue (1998)) as intuitively it is quite nice. Unfortunately, we find that CSSB has a number of undesirable properties. Therefore, we introduce a refinement of this which we call conservative stable weak predictor. We explore some existence properties of this new solution.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-011-0647-x
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Article provided by Springer & The Society for Social Choice and Welfare in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 537-552

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:2:p:537-552
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  1. Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2004. "Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation Games with Positive Spillovers," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 291-324, 05.
  2. John Duggan & Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "Dynamic Legislative Policy Making," Wallis Working Papers WP45, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  3. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
  4. Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005. "Strongly stable networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May.
  5. Xue, Licun, 1997. "Nonemptiness of the Largest Consistent Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 453-459, April.
  6. Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon Ana & Vannetelbosch Vincent, 2010. "Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  7. Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Mauleon Ana & Vannetelbosch J., 2000. "Social Rationalizability," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  8. Jean-Jacques HERINGS & Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2001. "Rationalizability for Social Environments," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2001028, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  9. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
  10. Greenberg, Joseph & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1996. "Multistage Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1415-37, November.
  11. Bhattacharya, Anindya, 2002. "Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 27-44, January.
  12. Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003. "Coalition formation as a dynamic process," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May.
  13. Peleg, Bezalel, 2002. "Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 395-423 Elsevier.
  14. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
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