International treaties on global pollution: a dynamic time-path analysis
In this paper we show that the formation of coalitions by subsets of countries might diminish the likelihood of a successful world-wide treaty on global pollution. Non-member countries may be less willing to sign a world-wide treaty than they would be in the absence of such coalitions. In fact, the coalition formation may raise the reservation utility of non-member countries above the world-wide treaty level and thus take away their incentives to sign it.
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1998054. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.