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Mergers, Investment Decisions and Internal Organisation

Author

Listed:
  • Albert Banal-Estañol
  • Ines Macho-Stadler
  • Jo Seldeslachts

Abstract

We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms’ internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more e.ciency and may even lead to efficiency losses. These mergers lead to lower total welfare, suggesting that a regulator should be careful in assuming that possible efficiency gains of a merger will be effectively realised. Moreover, the paper offers a possible explanation for merger failures.

Suggested Citation

  • Albert Banal-Estañol & Ines Macho-Stadler & Jo Seldeslachts, 2003. "Mergers, Investment Decisions and Internal Organisation," CESifo Working Paper Series 944, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_944
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Salmon, 2003. "The assignment of powers in an open-ended European Union," Post-Print hal-00445601, HAL.
    2. Miguel González-Maestre & Diego Peñarrubia, 2005. "Innovation, merger policy and technology transfer," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(1), pages 181-201, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    horizontal mergers; investment; efficiency gains; internal conflict;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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