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Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency

  • Sheng-Chieh Huang

    ()

  • Xiao Luo

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-006-0187-2
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 34 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 309-329

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:34:y:2008:i:2:p:309-329
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  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July.
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  4. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, . "Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions," Economics Working Papers 2001-2, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  5. Basu, K. & Weibull, J.W., 1990. "Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behaviour," Papers 479, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
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  7. Reza Oladi, 2004. "Strategic quotas on foreign investment and migration," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 289-306, August.
  8. Ma, Chenghu, 2000. "Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 451-482, March.
  9. E. Kalai & D. Schmeidler, 1975. "An Admissible Set Occurring in Various Bargaining Situations," Discussion Papers 191, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  11. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  12. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
  13. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
  14. Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1994. "Optimistic stability in games of perfect information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 199-214, December.
  15. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
  16. Ko Nishihara, 1999. "Stability of the cooperative equilibrium in N -person prisoners' dilemma with sequential moves," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 483-494.
  17. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 237, David K. Levine.
  18. Aliprantis, Charalambos D., 1999. "On the backward induction method," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 125-131, August.
  19. Nakanishi, Noritsugu, 1999. "Reexamination of the International Export Quota Game through the Theory of Social Situations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 132-152, April.
  20. Hendon, Ebbe & Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen & Sloth, Birgitte, 1996. "The One-Shot-Deviation Principle for Sequential Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 274-282, February.
  21. Einy, Ezra & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1995. "The Optimistic Stability of the Core Mapping in Public Goods Production Economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 523-28, November.
  22. Indrajit Ray, 1998. "Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 257-269.
  23. Xue, Licun, 1997. "Nonemptiness of the Largest Consistent Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 453-459, April.
  24. Tadelis, Steven, 1996. "Pareto Optimality and Optimistic Stability in Repeated Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 470-489, May.
  25. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, June.
  26. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  27. Xiao Luo & Yi-Chun Chen, 2004. "A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 472, Econometric Society.
  28. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine.
  29. Voorneveld, Mark, 2004. "Preparation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 403-414, August.
  30. Greenberg, Joseph & Monderer, Dov & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1996. "Multistage Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1415-37, November.
  31. Reza Oladi, 2005. "Stable Tariffs and Retaliations," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 205-215, 05.
  32. Lucas, William F., 1992. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 543-590 Elsevier.
  33. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2005. "Stable cartels revisited," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 907-921, November.
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