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Pool Formation with Three Patent Owners

Author

Listed:
  • Hao Liu

    (Institute of International Law, School of Law, Shandong University, Qingdao 266237, China)

  • Xuewen Qian

    (School of Economics, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo 315100, China)

  • Chen Qu

    (School of Economics, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo 315100, China)

  • Jingyi Shen

    (School of Finance and Trade, Wenzhou Business College, Wenzhou 325035, China)

Abstract

We analyze the endogenous formation of patent pools among three patent owners and the associated welfare effects. Under a condition of synergistic three-patent combination, either a unique symmetric equilibrium or infinitely many asymmetric equilibria can arise when patents are fragmented. By using the notion of equilibrium binding agreements, we show that (1) when there is a unique symmetric equilibrium under fragmented patents, the complete pool is both stable and welfare-maximizing; (2) fragmented patents are stable in the presence of infinitely many asymmetric equilibria; and (3) when considering only a single specific asymmetric equilibrium under fragmented patents, the complete pool is welfare-maximizing if it is stable, while fragmented patents can be both stable and welfare-maximizing under certain conditions. We also discuss an alternative version of synergism and an alternative bargaining protocol for patent pool formation.

Suggested Citation

  • Hao Liu & Xuewen Qian & Chen Qu & Jingyi Shen, 2025. "Pool Formation with Three Patent Owners," Games, MDPI, vol. 16(4), pages 1-17, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:16:y:2025:i:4:p:35-:d:1697221
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