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Strategic alliances as Stackelberg cartels - concept and equilibrium alliance structure

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  • Morasch, Karl
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-7187(98)00045-9
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 (February)
    Pages: 257-282

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:18:y:2000:i:2:p:257-282
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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    1. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, July.
    3. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    4. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    5. Spencer, Barbara J & Raubitschek, Ruth S, 1996. "High-Cost Domestic Joint Ventures and International Competition: Do Domestic Firms Gain?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(2), pages 315-340, May.
    6. Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
    7. Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
    8. Kwoka, John E, Jr, 1992. "The Output and Profit Effects of Horizontal Joint Ventures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 325-338, September.
    9. Combs, K. L., 1993. "The role of information sharing in cooperative research and development," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 535-551.
    10. Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn.
    11. Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W, 1991. "Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 658-665, June.
    12. Reinhard Selten, 1973. "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 008, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    13. Brodley, Joseph F, 1990. "Antitrust Law and Innovation Cooperation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 97-112, Summer.
    14. Reynolds, Robert J. & Snapp, Bruce R., 1986. "The competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 141-153, June.
    15. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
    16. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Colombo, 2016. "Mixed oligopolies and collusion," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(2), pages 167-184, June.
    2. Marc Escrihuela-Villar, 2009. "A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 137-147, March.
    3. Prokop, Jacek, 2011. "Powstawanie i stabilność karteli heterogenicznych
      [The emergence and stability of heterogeneous cartels]      ," MPRA Paper 43712, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Alderighi, Marco & Gaggero, Alberto A., 2014. "The effects of global alliances on international flight frequencies: Some evidence from Italy," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 30-33.
    5. Philippe Barla & Christos Constantatos, 2006. "On The Choice between Strategic Alliance and Merger in the Airline Sector: The Role of Strategic Effects," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 40(3), pages 409-424, September.
    6. Eerola, Essi & Maattanen, Niku, 2004. "Strategic alliances, joint investments, and market structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 241-251, February.
    7. Wen, Yuh-Horng & Hsu, Chaug-Ing, 2006. "Interactive multiobjective programming in airline network design for international airline code-share alliance," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 174(1), pages 404-426, October.
    8. Morasch, Karl, 2000. "Strategic alliances: a substitute for strategic trade policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 37-67, October.
    9. Qiu, Larry D., 2010. "Cross-border mergers and strategic alliances," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(6), pages 818-831, August.
    10. Fan, Terence & Vigeant-Langlois, Laurence & Geissler, Christine & Bosler, Björn & Wilmking, Jan, 2001. "Evolution of global airline strategic alliance and consolidation in the twenty-first century," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(6), pages 349-360.
    11. Aikaterini KOKKINOU, 2010. "Economic growth, innovation and collaborative research and development activities," Management & Marketing, Economic Publishing House, vol. 5(1), Spring.

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