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High-Cost Domestic Joint Ventures and International Competition: Do Domestic Firms Gain?

Author

Listed:
  • Spencer, Barbara J
  • Raubitschek, Ruth S

Abstract

This paper develops the idea that, when markets are imperfectly competitive, final-good producers may gain from a production joint venture (PJV) that produces part of their input requirements even though the PJV's marginal cost exceeds the input's market price. Production by the PJV lowers the market price of the input and this can raise final-good profits sufficiently to make the PJV worthwhile. Also, use of a joint venture internalizes the positive externality from a lower input price. These results are motivated by a setting in which domestic firms are dependent on foreign oligopolistic suppliers for a key input. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Spencer, Barbara J & Raubitschek, Ruth S, 1996. "High-Cost Domestic Joint Ventures and International Competition: Do Domestic Firms Gain?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(2), pages 315-340, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:37:y:1996:i:2:p:315-40
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    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Churen & Tian, Guoqiang, 2011. "Firms' organizational modes with productivity heterogeneity, demand uncertainty and production capacity," MPRA Paper 35667, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Kalu Ojah, 2007. "Costs, valuation, and long‐term operating effects of global strategic alliances," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(1), pages 69-90.
    3. Yongmin Chen & Jota Ishikawa & Zhihao Yu, 2026. "Trade Liberalization and Strategic Outsourcing," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Strategic Trade Policy, chapter 14, pages 351-376, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Colombo, Stefano & Scrimitore, Marcella, 2018. "Managerial delegation under capacity commitment: A tale of two sources," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 149-161.
    5. Jota Ishikawa & Barbara J. Spencer, 2026. "Rent-Shifting Export Subsidies with an Imported Intermediate Product," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Strategic Trade Policy, chapter 13, pages 307-350, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Akihiko Yanase & Yasushi Kawabata, 2008. "Strategic Import Policies in a Three Country Model with Vertically Related Industries," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(8), pages 1-7.
    7. Morasch, Karl, 2000. "Strategic alliances as Stackelberg cartels - concept and equilibrium alliance structure," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 257-282, February.
    8. Spencer, Barbara J & Qiu, Larry D, 2001. "Keiretsu and Relationship-Specific Investment: A Barrier to Trade?," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(4), pages 871-901, November.
    9. Chen, Zhiqi & Ross, Thomas W., 2003. "Cooperating upstream while competing downstream: a theory of input joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 381-397, March.
    10. Ki‐Dong Lee & Kangsik Choi & DongJoon Lee, 2020. "Endogenous vertical structure and trade policy in an import‐competing market," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(8), pages 1431-1445, December.
    11. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2008:i:8:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Long, Ngo Van & Soubeyran, Antoine, 2001. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 505-533, May.
    13. Rossini Gianpaolo & Vergari Cecilia, 2011. "Input Production Joint Venture," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-50, March.
    14. Morasch, Karl, 2000. "Strategic alliances: a substitute for strategic trade policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 37-67, October.
    15. Nicolas Aguelakakis & Aleksandr Yankelevich, 2019. "Collaborate Or Consolidate: Assessing The Competitive Effects Of Production Joint Ventures," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 73-84, January.
    16. Furusawa, Taiji & Higashida, Keisaku & Ishikawa, Jota, 2003. "What information is needed for welfare-enhancing policies under international oligopoly?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 31-46, January.
    17. Ishikawa, Jota & Lee, Ki-Dong, 1997. "Backfiring tariffs in vertically related markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-4), pages 395-423, May.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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