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Market Power versus Efficiency Effects of Mergers and Research Joint Ventures: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry

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  • Ralph Siebert
  • Klaus Gugler

Abstract

Merger control authorities may approve a merger based on a so-called 'efficiency defence'. An important aspect in clearing mergers is that the efficiencies need to be merger-specific. Joint ventures, and in particular research joint ventures (RJVs), may achieve comparable efficiencies possibly without the anti-competitive (market power) effects of mergers. We present evidence for the semiconductor industry that RJVs indeed represent viable alternatives to mergers. We empirically account for the endogenous formation of mergers and RJVs.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph Siebert & Klaus Gugler, 2004. "Market Power versus Efficiency Effects of Mergers and Research Joint Ventures: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry," NBER Working Papers 10323, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10323
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    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L49 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Other

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