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Valuations and dynamics of negotiations

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  • Armando Gomes

Abstract

This paper analyzes three‐party negotiations in the presence of externalities. We obtain a closed‐form solution for the Markov perfect equilibrium of a multilateral non‐cooperative bargaining model, yielding an equilibrium value and dynamics of negotiations that are supported by experimental studies. Players’ values are monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in the amount of negative (or positive) externalities that they impose on others. Moreover, players’ values are continuous and piecewise linear on the worth of bilateral coalitions, and are inextricably related to their negotiation strategies: the equilibrium value is the Nash bargaining solution when no bilateral coalitions form; the Shapley value when all bilateral coalitions form; or the nucleolus, when either one bilateral coalition among “natural partners” or two bilateral coalitions including a “pivotal player” form.

Suggested Citation

  • Armando Gomes, 2020. "Valuations and dynamics of negotiations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(1), pages 245-273, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:22:y:2020:i:1:p:245-273
    DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12410
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    Cited by:

    1. Rabah Amir & Myrna Wooders, 2021. "Introduction to the special issue on markets, policies, and economic design: Theory and experiments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 765-771, October.
    2. Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Andrea Guido & Mathieu Lefebvre, 2021. "Controlling monopoly power in a double‐auction market experiment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(5), pages 1074-1101, October.

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