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The increasing committee size paradox with small number of candidates

Author

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  • Eric Kamwa

    (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The Increasing Committee Size Paradox is a voting inconsistency that occurs under voting systems where voters cast exactly k votes when there are k seats to fill. This paradox occurs when, given an elected committee of size k, one of its member could not be elected if we were to elect a committee of size k + 1; even worse, the two committees may be disjoint. For three-candidate elections, we compute the likelihood of this paradox under the Impartial Anonymous Culture.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Kamwa, 2013. "The increasing committee size paradox with small number of candidates," Post-Print halshs-00865738, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00865738
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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Ahmed Doghmi, 2016. "Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 97-116, October.
    2. Kamwa, Eric & Merlin, Vincent, 2015. "Scoring rules over subsets of alternatives: Consistency and paradoxes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 130-138.
    3. Kamwa, Eric, 2017. "On stable rules for selecting committees," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 36-44.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Committee; voting Paradox; impartial anonymous culture; probability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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