Condorcet vs. Borda in Light of a Dual Majoritarian Approach
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- Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2011. "Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 151-162, August.
References listed on IDEAS
- Brams, Steven J. & Fishburn, Peter C., 2002.
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 173-236
- Brams, Steven J., 1994. "Voting procedures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 30, pages 1055-1089 Elsevier.
- Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2003. "The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 685-688, October.
- Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2007. "The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 69-84, April.
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- Gehrlein, William V. & Lepelley, Dominique, 1998. "The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 271-283, April.
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More about this item
KeywordsMajority decisiveness; Condorcet criterion; erosion of majority principle; the Borda method of counts;
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