On the Likelihood of Condorcet's Profiles
Consider a group of individuals who have to collectively choose an outcome from a finite set of feasible alternatives. A scoring or positional rule is an aggregation procedure where each voter awards a given number of points, Wj, to the alternative she ranks in Jth position in her preference ordering; the outcome chosen is then the alternative that receives the highest number of points. A Condorcet or majority winner is a candidate who obtains more votes than her opponents in any pairwise comparison.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: FACULTE UNIVERSITAIRE NOTRE-DAME DE LA PAIX, FACULTE DES SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES, RUE DE BRUXELLES NAMUR FRANCE.|
Web page: http://www.fundp.ac.be/facultes/eco/
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