An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
In this paper, we show that, in the class of games where each player’s strategy space is compact Hausdorff and each player’s payoff function is continuous and “concave-like,” rationalizability in a variety of general preference models yields the unique set of outcomes of iterated strict dominance. The result implies that rationalizable strategic behavior in these preference models is observationally indistinguishable from that in the subjective expected utility model, in this class of games. Our indistinguishability result can be applied not only to mixed extensions of finite games, but also to other important applications in economics, for example, the Cournot–oligopoly model. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
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Volume (Year): 51 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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